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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

THE REQUIREMENT OF "GOOD MOTIVES
AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS"
Illinois is one of 19 states whose constitutional or statutory law requires
more than "truth" as a defense to civil defamation.' The Illinois provision,
which appears in section 4 of the bill of rights of the 1870 constitution,
reads as follows:
Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for
libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good2
motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.
[Emphasis suplied.]
The purpose of this section is to consider what effect, if any, this
provision has had on the development of the law of defamation in Illinois.
It is generally agreed that truth has for centuries been a complete
defense to an action for civil defamation. This was true in England in the
years before the American Revolution; it was true in the colonies and in the
states until the first of them-Maine--enacted legislation in 1833 which
appeared to be to the contrary. 3 Following that step, other states, including
Illinois, enacted constitutional provisions, or legislative provisions, or both,
which appeared to add the elements of good motives or justifiable ends to
the common law truth defense.
The situation with respect to criminal defamation is entirely different.
It was concerning criminal defamation that the statement, "the greater the
truth, the greater the libel" was made; 4 and because the logic behind the
crime of criminal libel was the tendency of libelous statements to cause
breaches of the peace, truth was considered irrelevant to the gravity of the
crime and was not even admissible in evidence in defense of a charge of
criminal libel. 5
Truth became admissible in criminal libel prosecutions beginning with
the enactment of a statute by the state of New York in 1805 which provided:
...[I]n every prosecution for libel, it shall be lawful for any defendant to give in evidence ...

the truth ...

provided always, that

such evidence shall not be a justification, unless on the trial it shall
1 1 Harper & James, Torts 415-6 (1956); Prosser, Torts 631 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Ill. Const., art II, § 4 (1870).
3 For a review of the history, see Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of
Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 789 (1964). The Maine
statute read: "Be it enacted . . . that in every prosecution for writing and publishing any
libel, it shall be lawful for any defendant ... to give in evidence the truth of the matter
charged as libelous, and the truth of such matter being established the same shall be held
a complete justification; unless it shall be made to appear that the matter charged as
libelous originated from corrupt or malicious motives." (Me. Laws 1832033, ch. 73).
4 De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606); 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 125-6 (l1th ed. 1791).
5 See, e.g., State v. Lehre, 2 Brevard 466 (S.C. 1811).
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be further made satisfactorily to appear, that the matter charged as6
libellous was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
This legislation, and other similar legislation which followed in other
states, was intended to provide and did provide increased protection for
the defendant; it did not make his defense more difficult but rather provided
him with a new defense-truth plus motives-which had not before been
available to him.
It is important to remember, therefore, that the previously quoted provision of the 1870 Illinois constitution offers increased protection to the
defendant accused of criminal libel; but if it is interpreted as is generally
done it decreases the common law protection of the civil defendant. In view
of the fact that to decrease the area of protection of citizens is not a typical
objective of a "bill of rights," and in view of the fact that the General
Assembly passed implementing legislation applicable to criminal cases but
has never passed such legislation with respect to civil cases, a persuasive
argument can be made that the constitutional provision should be interpreted as an "outer limit" provision-prescribing that three elements
(truth + motives + ends) must always be a sufficient defense to criminal
libel, but that something less may be a sufficient defense to either civil or
criminal libel, unless the legislature chooses to raise the requirements to
the three elements listed above. Under this "outer limit" interpretation,
the legislature could constitutionally require all three elements for an
effective truth defense, but no more. In the absence of legislation, the coma sufficient defense to civil defamamon law, under which truth alone was
7
effect.
in
be
to
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would
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Indeed, in Illinois, truth alone remained a sufficient defense to actions
for civil libel under the 1818 constitution. The first cases that arose under
the 1870 provision, LaMonte v. Kent 8 and Tilton v. Maley,9 were decided
on the theory that the provision of the 1870 constitution had not changed
the common law with respect to civil libel.
The LaMonte case involved a candidate for the Illinois State Senate.
The defendant published a circular saying that the plaintiff candidate was
"a man who has been caught in embezzlement, in passing bogus drafts. .. "
The defendant pleaded both the truth of the statement, based on specific
instances which he described, and that the statement was made without
malice (but not specifically that it was made with good motives and for
justifiable ends). A judgment for the defendant was upheld, the court
stating:
Truth, under the Constitution, if proven, is a complete defense
provided the publication was made with good motives and for
6
7
8
9

N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 90, § 2 (1805).
For an elaboration of this line of argument, see op. cit. supra note 3.
App. 1 (lst Dist. 1911).
163 Ill.
186 I1. App. 307 (2d Dist. 1914).
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justifiable ends. If he [plaintiff] was unfit for office,
then their
motive was good and the end sought was justifiable. 1°
In the LaMonte case the argument of the court eliminates the need for the
defendant to establish good motives and justifiable ends: to want the truth
known is in itself a proper motive; to publish the truth is in itself a justifiable end.
In 1914, in Tilton v. Maley,"' an Illinois appellate court did not take
refuge in circular reasoning but met the question head-on..In that case, the
plaintiff urged that truth should not be considered a perfect defense because
the defamatory publication concerned "vices of youth long abandoned and
forgotten." Judgment in the lower court was for the defendant, after a plea
of truth to which the plaintiff demurred. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment, stating that the sole question before it was whether or not in a
civil action for libel the truth alone is a sufficient defense or whether it must
further appear that the publication was made with good motives and for
justifiable ends.
After pointing out that truth alone had been sufficient at common law,
the court stated that the Illinois constitutional provision was intended
solely to enlarge the protection of citizens from governmental prosecution
for criminal libel. The court then said:
When we remember that this line of constitutional law began in an
attempt to give greater liberty of speech, and that its whole history
... is to guarantee. . . freedom of speech and publication, it seems
to us judicial legislation to give effect to the provision as abridging
freedom of expression by repealing the existing common law, under
which truth alone was a sufficient defense. The framers of our
constitution intended that no one should ever become liable under
any existing law or any future law, in either a civil or a criminal
action, for publication of the truth with good motives and for
justifiable ends; they used the words "or civil" giving the provision
an effect beyond that of the Constitution of 1848. But it does not
follow that they were aiming at the protection of reputation.
If the provision had been so intended it would have been differently worded and entitled. There is nothing in this provision
to prevent the legislature from enacting a law under which the
truth alone will not be a defense in a civil action, as it has in
effect provided in criminal actions; and nothing so far as we can
see to prevent it from entirely abolishing all laws against libel. In
short it is left, as far as this provision goes, to the legislature to act
as it sees fit, provided only it must not interfere with2 publishing
the truth with good motives and for justifiable ends.'
Essentially this court held that the common law rule on civil libel was
still in effect in Illinois because the legislature had not changed it; that
10 LaMonte v. Kent, supra note 8, at 5.
11 Supra note 9.
12

Id. at 313-14.
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the legislature could change it; but that if the legislature did change it, it
could not impose more stringent restrictions on speech than those specified
in the constitution.
In the same year, in the case of Szimkus v. Ragauckas,13 the defense
of truth and the correct interpretation of the motives-and-ends provision
were considered but this case turned on the question of qualified privilege.
However, the dicta on the admissibility of evidence to prove the defemation
true suggested that the court thought that a libel per se, published beyond
the scope of the privilege, could not have been published for acceptable
14
reasons, regardless of whether or not the statement was true.
The definitive interpretation of the constitutional provision was made
in 1919 in the case of Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co. 15 It was directly
contrary to the theory so well expressed in Tilton. In the first place, the
court held that the constitutional provision was self-executing and that no
legislation was required to find that it had changed the common law. In
the second place it held that the defendant was barred from offering a truth
defense unless he could first show proper motives and ends.
During a political campaign the Rockford Star criticized the plaintiff,
who was the candidate of the Socialist Party. In three consecutive articles the
Star made statements such as these about candidate Ogren: "Gab, dynamite,
and blowing up tenement houses to hell do not produce work.... Socialism
means terror, unrest, and financial ruin ..
" It accused Ogren of believing
in, advocating, and pursuing such methods of direct action. All three articles
where held to be libelous per se.
At trial, the defendant newspaper's strategy was to ask the plaintiff, on
cross examination, whether or not he had spoken or written certain words
which the defendant quoted and which the defendant had used as the bases
for its charges that the plaintiff believed in violent revolution. The plaintiff
answered, over the objections of his counsel, that he had written or spoken
the words in question. The problem was whether or not this testimony
should be admitted into evidence as probative of the defendant's charges,
in view of the fact that the defendant had not justified his motives and his
ends.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that it should not be admitted, holding, apparently, that the proper motives and ends must be shown before the
truth can be utilized. In so holding, the court ignored both LaMonte and
17
Tilton and relied on a 1908 Nebraska case'" and a 1914 Florida case.
189 Ill. App. 407 (Ist Dist. 1914).
14 Id. at 410.
15 288 Il1. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
10 Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 118 N.W. 1071 (1908).
17 Taylor v. Tribune Publishing Co., 67 Fla. 361, 65 So. 3 (1914).
13
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Since that time, in the entire United States only one case, decided in
Wyoming in 1947, has been concerned with motives and ends as distinct
from truth and from malice.' 8 The fact that the question arises so infrequently suggests that the requirement of proper motives and ends is
becoming a purely formal one and that in those states where it exists the
courts will go a long way to protect statements which they believe to be true.
The requirement that motives and ends, as well as truth, are required
to make out a defense to civil libel, has had some effect on the formalities of
pleading the truth, but apparently none on the results. An analysis of
Illinois cases since Ogren uncovers none which permitted recovery against
a defendant who told the exact truth and could prove it; and none to a
newspaper defendant that could prove that it told the essential truth and
acted without malice. So far as can be determined, there has never been a
case-except Ogren-which went beyond requiring the absence of malice to
demand a showing of some kind of positive good motives.
What motives would be "good," what ends would be "justifiable," are
unanswered questions. The answers may ultimately be those suggested in
the LaMonte case-to want the truth to be known is in itself a good
motive; to speak so that the truth may be known is in itself a justifiable end.
This approach was used many years ago by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court 19 in a decision quoted with approval last year by the United States
20
Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana:
It has been said it is lawful to publish truth from good motives,
and for justifiable ends. But this rule is too narrow. If there is a
lawful occasion-a legal right to make a publication-and the
matter true,
the end is justifiable and that, in such case, must be
21
sufficient.
MRs. B. SIDLER

DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
In Illinois and in other states as well, citizens and newspapers who have
criticized public officials and candidates for public office have had to pay
both damages for civil defamation and fines for criminal libel. If they were
unable to prove the truth of their charges, and in Illinois if they were
unable to prove good motives and justifiable ends as well, their speech was
not protected. The free exchange of views and information on matters of
public concern which the First Amendment was enacted to protect could
be and often was severely inhibited by the sanctions of a civil suit or a
criminal prosecution.
18 Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947).
19 State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 31 Am. Dec. 217 (1837).
20 379 U.S. 64, 85 Sup. Ct. 209 (1964).
21 Id. at 73, 85 Sup. Ct. at 215.

